UC-NRLF 


$B    SfiT    E7M 


GIFT  OF 
Mrs.   Beck 


eciprocal  Representation 
in  a  World's  Assembly 


International  Bonding 

AND 

.eciprocity  Defense  Army 

(International) 


Suggestions  for  the  Advocates 

Of  and  Opponents  To  the 

League  of  Nations 


By  Emil  G.  Beck,  M.  D. 

Chicago,  111. 


8¥ 


Uf^  ^' 


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The  essential  points : 

A.  AN  INTERNATIONAL  LEGISLATIVE 

BODY  WITH  JUDICIAL  POWERS 

(Chosen  by  Reciprocal  Method) 

Each  nation  to  send  a  fixed  number  of  Representa- 
tives, but  instead  of  choosing  all  from  among  its  own 
citizens,  two  of  these  representatives  to  be  selected 
from  its  own  country  and  one  from  each  of  the  other 
countries.  This  RECIPROCAL  method  of  choosing 
Representatives  will  create  an  extraordinary  assem- 
blage of  Statesmen,  who  will  constitute  an  impartial 
WORLD  PARLIAMENT. 

B.  All  nations  to  enter  into  a 

UNIVERSAL  ALLIANCE  TREATY   (Bond) 
which  provided  against  violation  of  its  terms, 
the  forfeiture  of  heavy  bonds  furnished  by  the 
co-signers  (bonds  not  their  own  issue) 

C.  A  suggestion  for  the  formation  and  economical 
maintenance  of  an 

INTERNATIONAL     DEFENSE     ARMY 
(RECIPROCAL) 


829757 


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SUGGESTIONS  FOR  THE  ADVOCATES  AND 

THE  OPPONENTS   OF  THE  LEAGUE 

OF  NATIONS 

By  Dr.  Emil  G.  Beck, 
Chicago. 

The  present  conditions  in  Europe  are  so  threatening 
that  in  the  turmoil  it  is  hardly  possible  for  men  to 
formulate  a  perfect  agreement  for  a  lasting  peace. 
It  would  be  like  asking  a  man  to  write  his  will  in  a 
state  of  delirium.  Documents  of  such  paramount 
importance  must  be  worked  out  under  the  most  favor- 
able conditions.  Serenity  of  mind  and  composure  are 
essential  for  the  discussion  of  the  innumerable  phases 
of  this  tremendous  problem. 

The  expression  of  opinion  of  the  people  of  each 
country  is  also  very  essential,  as  they  are  to  be  the 
real  bearers  of  the  burdens,  and  recipients  of  the 
benefits  resulting  from  the  new  order  of  things. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  questions  should  be 
submitted  to  a  referendum.  The  matter  is  too  com- 
plicated, too  large,  and  too  intricate  to  be  left  to  a 
majority  vote  of  laymen. 

Even  authorities  on  International  questions,  the  ex- 
perts, are  divided  in  their  opinion  as  to  the  practicabil- 
ity and  soundness  of  the  covenant  of  the  League. 


![:'Trfit\*falla3:y.*.of'such  a  way  of  solving  the  problem 
is  analagous'to' the  following:  Suppose  a  man  were 
ill  and  the  best  experts  were  called  in  consultation 
but  could  not  agree  upon  a  diagnosis  and  treatment. 
If  in  this  dilemma  one  of  the  experts  should  suggest 
leaving  the  diagnosis  to  the  members  of  the  family, 
would  we  consider  that  the  best  way  of  curing  the 
patient  ? 

Our  Representatives  in  Congress,  and  in  the  Senate 
whom  the  citizens  elect  to  act  for  them,  are  no  doubt 
better  judges  and  they  should  decide  whether  the 
covenant  should  be  accepted,  modified  or  rejected. 

While  we  are  waiting  for  the  settlement  of  Euro- 
pean affairs,  let  us  have  practical  suggestions  from 
those  who  have  any  to  offer.  It  is  possible  that  from 
some  obscure  source,  an  idea,  very  simple  perhaps,  may 
come  which  will  appeal  to  those  who  are  now  studying 
the  problem  and  help  them  to  evolve  a  plan  devoid 
of  the  objections  now  raised  by  the  adversaries  of  the 
League.  May  I  be  permitted  at  this  time  to  make 
some  suggestions?  I  wish  to  bring  to  the  attention 
of  the  reader  first  an  abstract  of  the  plan  which  I 
submitted  two  years  ago  to  the  State  Department  at 
Washington,  which  plan  has  also  been  in  the  hands 
of  Colonel  House  and  all  Senators  since  January, 
1917.  The  two  principal  suggestions  contained  therein 
deal  with  the  very  points  now  being  threshed  out,  and 
their  adoption,  possibly  in  a  modified  form,  may  help 
to  solve  the  problem. 


A.  RECIPROCAL  REPRESENTATION  IN  A 
WORLD'S  ASSEMBLY. 

B.  INTERNATIONAL  BONDING.        (Origin- 
ally published  in  1917.) 

The  main  barrier  to  a  lasting  pease  is  the  unfor- 
tunate circumstance  that  nations  do  not  trust  one 
another  sufficiently  to  allow  matters  of  dispute  to  be 
adjusted  by  a  Court  of  Arbitration.  They  are  not 
yet  willing  to  submit  vital  issues  for  arbitration  to  a 
body  of  judges  delegated  by  the  different  nations, 
unless  they  are  convinced  that  in  the  hands  of  these 
judges  their  interests  will  be  safeguarded  to  at  least 
the  same  degree  as  they  would  be  by  force  of  arms. 
They  fear  that  even  men  with  the  highest  ideals ;  with 
the  greatest  respect  for  the  rights  of  others,  and  with 
the  strongest  desire  to  be  impartial,  would  when  their 
native  land  is  threatened,  unconsciously  decide  in  favor 
of  their  own  country. 

Quoting  Prof.  Adler: 

"The  Judges  you  secure  may  be  upright  men,  but 
the  bias  in  the  blood  will  tell.  We  had  this  exem- 
plified among  ourselves  in  the  case  of  the  Hayes- 
Tilden  Commission.  The  country  was  on  the  verge 
of  civil  war.  It  was  finally  decided  to  pass  the 
matter  in  dispute  over  to  fifteen  jurists,  the  best  in 
the  country.  No  one  doubted  their  uprightness  nor 
their  disposition  to  be  fair;  but  every  time  they 
voted  on  a  material  question,  the  Commission  stood 


eight  to  seven.  Eight  Republicans  to  seven  Demo- 
crats. And  the  impartial  historian  says  that  it  was 
the  bias  of  party  which  in  this  crucial  instance, 
though  they  were  not  conscious  of  it,  gave  direction 
to  the  legal  mind." 

It  will  be  very  difficult  to  secure  an  absolutely  im- 
partial Court  of  Arbitration;  a  Court  constituted  to 
guard  against  possible  formation  of  cliques,  the  mem- 
bers of  which  in  deciding  vital  issues,  might  cast  their 
votes  for  the  country  which  they  favor  or  to  which 
they  owe  allegiance.  It  is  thus  evident  that  before  a 
League  of  Nations  or  any  other  form  of  affiliation  of 
nations  can  succeed,  this  one  obstacle  must  be  elim- 
inated. To  overcome  this  vital  objection,  I  make  the 
following  suggestion : 

As  a  basis  for  working  out  a  plan,  I  have  applied 
two  fundamental  principles,  namely: 

1.  THAT  RECIPROCITY  IS  THE  MOST  PO- 
TENT FACTOR  IN  RETAINING  THE 
FRIENDSHIP  OF  A  NEIGHBOR. 

2.  THAT  A  BOND  STRENGTHENS  A  PROM- 
ISE. 

The  two  principles  are  applied  in  the  formation  of 

A.  AN  INTERNATIONAL  LEGISLATIVE 
BODY  WITH  JUDICIAL  AND  EXECUTIVE 
POWERS.  (CHOSEN  RECIPROCALLY) 


B.  THE  SIGNING  OF  AN  INTERNATIONAL 
TREATY  AGAINST  WARS,  SECURED  BY 
HEAVY  BONDING,  EACH  NATION  TO 
FURNISH  FOREIGN  BONDS. 

A. 

INTERNATIONAL  LEGISLATIVE  BODY 
WITH  JUDICIAL  POWER  (RECIPROCAL) 

INSTEAD  OF  EACH  NATION  SELECTING 
ITS  REPRESENTATIVES  FROM  AMONG  ITS 
OWN  CITIZENS,  EACH  SHOULD  CHOOSE 
TWO  FROM  ITS  OWN,  AND  FIVE  OR  MORE 
ADDITIONAL  REPRESENTATIVES  FROM 
OTHER  NATIONS,  BUT  NO  MORE  THAN  ONE 
FROM  ANY  ONE  FOREIGN  COUNTRY.  THUS 
ALL  NATIONS  WOULD  HAVE  AN  OPPOR- 
TUNITY OF  CHOOSING  MEN  WELL  KNOWN 
TO  THEM,  IN  WHOSE  INTEGRITY  AND  HON- 
ESTY  THEY  HAVE  THE  FULLEST  CONFI- 
DENCE AND  TO  WHOM  THEY  WOULD 
UNHESITATINGLY  SUBMIT  MATTERS  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTE. 

In  England  the  members  of  Parliament  are  not 
always  chosen  from  the  counties  and  boroughs  in 
which  they  live.  Why  can  not  the  same  principle  be 
used  internationally? 


By  employing  this  system  of  choosing  Representa- 
tives, the  danger  of  partiality  to  one's  own  country 
would  materially  diminish.  Each  representative  would 
consider  it  a  point  of  honor  to  deal  fairly  with  the 
country  which  placed  implicit  confidence  in  him.  For 
self  interest  he  would  act  impartially,  because  his  own 
country,  in  turn,  is  dependent  upon  the  honesty  and 
fairness  of  that  foreign  representative  which  it  has 
selected.  Such  interlocking  representation  would 
undoubtedly  fuse  the  interests  of  nations  and  the  per- 
sonal contact  of  the  representatives  would  inevitably 
result  in  friendly  relationship  among  nations.  Recip- 
rocity of  delegates  would  thus  create  the  strongest 
bond  possible  between  the  powers.  A  simple  illustra- 
tion may  serve  to  show  how  this  principle  of  recip- 
rocity and  allegiance  to  both  sides  operates  between 
man  and  man. 

A  and  B,  two  life-long  friends  make  a  vow  never  to 
quarrel  over  business  matters.  To  provide  against 
a  possible  break  in  their  friendship  A  suggests  that  in 
the  event  of  a  dispute  they  leave  the  matter  to  a  third 
party;  a  mutual  friend  of  both.  This  third  party  (C), 
however,  happens  to  be  a  relative  of  B.  C  agrees  to 
be  arbitrator  and  promises  that  he  will  be  loyal  to  both 
his  friend  and  his  relative,  in  case  a  dispute  should 
ever  arise.  The  unexpected  happens;  A  and  B  have 
fallen  out  on  account  of  a  misunderstanding  in  a  large 
financial  deal.  C  is  called  to  act  as  arbitrator.  He  is 
morally  bound  to  his  friend  to  be  just  and  fair,  and 
at  the  same  time  is  very  anxious  to  safeguard  the 
interests  of  his   relative.     His  allegiance  is  divided. 


It  is  in  such  a  situation  that  each  delegate  to  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  would  find  himself. 
He  owes  his  allegiance  to  his  country;  but  he  is  also 
in  honor  bound  not  to  betray  the  nation  which  placed 
such  confidence  in  him  in  selecting  him  as  its  repre- 
sentative, with  full  knowledge  that  he  was  a  citizen 
of  a  foreign  country. 

This  principle  of  choosing  Representatives,  once 
adopted,  would  open  the  way  for  further  elaboration 
of  details,  which  must,  of  course,  be  worked  out  by 
statesmen  such  as  those  composing  the  Advisory 
Board,  now  gathering  to  work  out  a  feasible  plan. 

The  members  of  this  international  assembly  might 
select  from  their  midst  a  smaller  number  to  form  an 
INTERNATIONAL  SUPREME  COURT  OF  AP- 
PEALS to  whose  final  decision  any  dispute  would  be 
referred,  should  it  fail  to  obtain  satisfactory  settle- 
ment by  the  International  Court  of  Justice. 

Whether  all  countries  should  be  admitted  to  the 
League  and  whether  all  countries  should  have  an  equal 
number  of  representatives  is  a  matter  for  the  Advis- 
ory Board  to  establish.  It  is  my  humble  opinion  that 
there  should  be  an  equal  but  small  number  of  Repre- 
sentatives; not  more  than  seven  from  each  nation. 
The  voting  power  of  all  nations  should,  however,  not 
he  the  same.  The  latter  should  be  based  on  the  fol- 
lowing conditions: 

(A)  Population 

(B)  Commerce    (shipping,  banking,  manufactur- 
ing, mining) 

9 


(C)  Wealth  (Natural  resources,  Accumulated  im- 
proved property) 

(D)  Educational  qualifications  (possibly  based  on 
literacy) 

To  grant  each  nation,  whether  large  or  small,  rich 
or  poor,  the  giant  or  dwarf  in  Commerce  and  Finance, 
the  same  voting  power,  would  lead  to  great  inequality 
and  injustice.  It  cannot  be  based  on  one  factor  alone, 
several  factors  must  be  taken  into  account.  If  popu- 
lation alone  were  the  guide,  then  China  with  four 
millions  of  inhabitants  would  have  a  voting  power 
four  times  as  great  as  the  United  States,  and  eighty 
times  as  great  as  Switzerland ;  and  similar  inequalities 
would  arise  if  commerce  or  wealth  alone  were  taken 
as  a  guide  for  establishing  the  number  of  votes  to 
which  each  country  should  be  entitled. 

If,  therefore,  by  proper  calculation,  each  country 
were  allotted  a  number  of  voting  units  based  upon 
each  of  the  above  mentioned  factors,  no  one  could 
find  fault  with  the  method,  especially  if  reciprocal 
representation  were  in  operation ;  for  this  alone  would 
insure  to  the  nation  having  small  voting  power  the 
security  of  justice. 

B. 

INTERNATIONAL  ALLIANCE  TREATY 

What  measures  shall  be  taken  to  compel  a  nation 
to  live  up  to  its  new  treaties?  NEW  TREATIES 
will  have  to  be  entered  into  and  here  difficulties  will 


10 


arise.  At  present  treaties  are  not  regarded  with  the 
same  confidence  and  respect  by  the  powers  as  they 
were  before  this  war.  We  have  striking  examples  to 
prove  this  fact.  The  Allies  will  be  reluctant  to  sign 
new  treaties  unless  absolute  assurance  is  given  that 
some  power  even  greater  than  the  sword  will  compel 
the  co-signers  to  live  up  to  their  agreements.  They 
will  demand  a  positive  guarantee  that  the  signing  of 
the  papers  is  not  a  mere  formality  and  that  the  treaty 
will  not  become  a  mere  scrap  of  paper  when  its  terms 
conflict  with  the  interests  of  one  of  the  co-signers. 
What  satisfactory  guarantee  could  be  given?  I  make 
the  following  suggestion: 

LET  THE  NATIONS  ENTER  INTO  A  TREATY 
WHICH  EMBODIES  PRACTICALLY  A  CODE 
OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAWS,  TO  BE  WORKED 
OUT  BY  THE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSEMBLY, 
THIS  TREATY  BINDING  THE  NATIONS  TO 
ITS  OBSERVANCE  BY  A  SUBSTANTIAL 
BOND  OF  THE  SIGNERS. 

The  objection  may  be  raised  that  should  a  real 
emergency  arise  a  nation  might  repudiate  its  bond. 
This  objection  may  be  met  by  providing  that  the  bonds 
furnished  by  a  nation  shall  not  be  paper  of  its  own 
issue  but  securities  bought  of  other  countries,  thus 
making  their  repudiation  practically  impossible. 

To  illustrate  the  latter  proposition:  Japan,  for  in- 
stance, would  deposit  securities  purchased  from  other 
countries.     The  amounts  purchased  from  each  coun- 


11 


try  to  be  so  proportioned  as  to  furnish  a  certain  per- 
centage of  securities  of  as  many  countries  as  possible, 
for  instance: 

10%  of  French  Bonds, 

10%  of  English  Bonds, 

10%  of  U.  S.  Bonds, 

5%  of  Swiss  Bonds, 

5%  of  Argentine  Bonds, 

60%  of  other  countries. 

^'  Government 

or 
Industrial 

England,  Russia,  United  States,  and  all  other  coun- 
tries entering  the  League  to  do  likewise.  The  aggre- 
gate deposit  by  each  nation  must  be  so  large  as  to 
make  it  prohibitive  for  that  nation  to  forfeit  it. 

The  bonds  shall  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  IN- 
TERNATIONAL BOARD  OF  TRUSTEES,  chosen 
by  all  the  countries  which  enter  into  this  international 
agreement. 

Special  treaties  between  individual  nations  need  not 
be  secured  by  any  additional  bonds,  because  all  ques- 
tions of  dispute  would  be  settled  by  an  International 
Court  of  Arbitration  and  its  decision  would  be  binding. 

12 


c. 


A  RECIPROCITY  ARMY 

We  must,  however,  bear  in  mind  that  in  the  present 
turmoil  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  make  a  very  radical 
reduction  in  the  naval  or  military  strength  of  the 
world.  Radical  changes  must  not  be  made  suddenly. 
For  this  reason,  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  present, 
for  each  country  to  maintain  a  certain  military  and 
naval  force  until  there  is  a  readjustment  of  present 
international  affairs.  Time  will  change  conditions; 
the  relations  among  nations  will  again  become  fra- 
ternal; but  until  such  time,  we  must  retain  a  weapon 
aside  from  these  agreements.  A  more  potent  re- 
straint must  be  kept  in  order  to  check  an  ambitious 
belligerent  who  might  suddenly  break  all  rules  and 
promises  should  he  become  involved  in  a  controversy 
which  he  beHeves  is  not  ad  judicable. 

If,  then,  for  the  present,  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  retain  a  certain  amount  of  force  as  a  safeguard, 
could  we  suggest  some  practical  and  economical  main- 
tenance of  a  RECIPROCITY  DEFENSE  ARMY? 

If  the  nations  were  assured  that  they  could  count 
upon  each  other  for  their  combined  but  small  forces 
against  an  aggressor,  it  would  be  entirely  superfluous 
for  each  of  them  to  maintain  a  large  military  organ- 
ization. On  the  other  hand,  if  each  nation  must  indi- 
vidually protect  its  own  rights  and  interests,  each 
would  be  obliged  to  maintain  an  army  so  large  that  at 
any  time  it  might  be  pitted  against  a  combination  of 


13 


other  powers  who  are  equally  prepared.  This  stu- 
pendous competition  in  preparedness  has  in  the  past 
absorbed  a  large  part  of  the  energy  and  the  savings 
of  the  human  race.  Why  can  not  the  powers  combine 
their  forces  and  keep  them  in  readiness  for  an  emer- 
gency? A  small  force  allotted  to  each  nation  in  its 
proper  proportion  would  be  just  as  effective  as  a  large 
force  on  each  side,  and  it  would  be  vastly  more  econ- 
omical. I  would,  therefore,  suggest  a  plan  most  econ- 
omical and  at  the  same  time  sufficiently  effective  to 
check  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  any  nation  to  create 
war. 

A.  Each  nation  to  have  a  small  standing  army  of 
well  trained,  well  paid  soldiers,  not  larger  than  is  ac- 
tually necessary  to  protect  itself  against  internal  dis- 
turbances. 

B.  The  armies  of  all  countries  should  have  a  com- 
bined general  staff  so  that  the  armies  may  be  trained 
on  the  same  principles  of  warfare  and  should  be  so 
organized  that  at  the  shortest  notice  a  call  would  bring 
together  a  force  large  enough  to  check  aggression. 

C.  Finally,  a  number  of  regiments  of  the  army  of 
one  country  should  be  stationed  in  diiferent  sections 
of  foreign  countries  for  a  stated  period.  For  illus- 
tration— an  American  soldier  would  serve  one  year 
at  home,  six  months  in  France  and  six  months  in 
Italy  and  the  French  or  Italian  soldier  would  have  a 
like  experience.  This  would  give  all  armies  an  equal 
chance  to  perfect  themselves  in  military  training  and 


14 


become  acquainted  with  the  military  tactics  of  all 
countries.  At  the  same  time,  the  military  force  of  all 
countries  would  become  familiar  with  the  terrain  of 
the  various  countries,  which,  in  case  of  a  sudden  out- 
break of  war,  would  be  a  great  advantage  to  the 
combined  powers  in  checking  the  aggressor. 

This  plan  is  not  intended  to  replace  other  plans — 
it  merely  offers  some  suggestions  based  upon  fund- 
amental principles  which  may  be  incorporated  into  the 
plans  already  under  consideration. 

Only  the  most  optimistic  could  have  hoped  that  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  drafted  at  Ver- 
sailles would  pass  without  opposition.  No  sooner  did 
the  text  appear  in  the  press  than  opposition  rang  out 
in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  Convincing  argu- 
ments by  the  opponents  clashed  with  equally  convinc- 
ing arguments  by  the  President  and  the  advocates  of 
the  League.  Let  us  not  doubt  the  sincerity  of  those 
who  oppose  or  advocate  its  adoption;  and  listen  to 
both  sides.  If  the  League  in  its  present  form  is  not 
perfect,  let  us  improve  it  so  as  to  make  it  acceptable 
to  all.  It  will  probably  never  be  perfect.  All  nations 
will  have  to  make  some  concessions  if  the  world  is  to 
be  spared  a  repetition  of  such  a  catastrophe  as  we 
have  just  gone  through. 

The  League  must  fulfill  certain  requirements: 

I.    It  must  prevent  future  wars,  for  that  is  its  main 
object. 


15 


2.  It  must  not  impair  to  any  considerable  degree 
the  sovereignty  of  any  nation. 

3.  It  must  simplify  rather  than  complicate  inter- 
national relations. 

4.  It  must  create  more  friendly  relations  between 
nations. 

If  the  present  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations 
had  fulfilled  these  requirements,  so  many  objections 
from  the  Senators  would  not  have  arisen  for  these  gen- 
tlemen would  welcome  a  covenant  which  gave  assurance 
against  war,  providing  it  did  not  seriously  conflict  with 
the  traditions  of  the  United  States  of  America.  While 
there  are  a  great  many  objectors  to  the  League  of 
Nations  in  its  present  form,  very  few  people  are  abso- 
lutely opposed  to  some  sort  of  a  League. 

Why  cannot  the  chosen  Representatives  of  partici- 
pating nations  draft  an  agreement  so  wisely  and  so 
carefully  as  to  make  it  accepable  and  safe  for  all? 
They  can,  but  it  cannot  be  done  in  haste. 

OTHER  SUGGESTIONS: 

The  League  of  Nations  should  make  its  start  in  the 
most  simple  form.  Its  main  object  for  the  present 
should  be  the  prevention  of  future  wars.  Other  in- 
ternational questions  (except  those  which  are  essential 
to  the  initial  program  of  the  League  of  Nations,  as 


16 


for  instance,  disarmament)  should  be  left  out  for  the 
present.  The  League  once  in  operation  would  admit 
of  additions  later  on. 

Let  us  then  make  a  start  and  gradually  enlarge  its 
scope  as  we  see  it  work.  Questions  of  labor  and 
capital,  immigration,  and  of  trade  may  be  included 
later,  if  the  nations  so  desire.  By  including  too  many 
problems  in  the  initial  document  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  we  invite  too  many  objections  and  objectors. 
After  the  fundamentals  have  been  accepted,  other 
questions  will  readily  yield  to  inclusion  because  the 
machinery  will  then  be  in  operation. 

Has  not  the  League  Document  in  its  present  form 
raised  too  many  questions?  Note  the  opposition  and 
the  arguments  advanced  against  the  League  by  the 
Senators : 

"It  will  conflict  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine"  is  one. 

"It  will  give  England  too  great  a  voting  power"  is 
another. 

"It  will  invite  war  instead  of  preventing  it"  another, 
and  quite  a  number  of  very  potent  and  justifiable  ob- 
jections. If  no  one  invalidates  these  objections — the 
League  of  Nations  is  likely  to  stand  alone  and  take 
the  chance  that  all  nations  will  remain  friendly  to  us, 
even  if  we  are  very  careful  not  to  offend  them.  Could 
we  in  the  case  of  an  American-Mexican  controversy 
be  sure  that  Japan  would  keep  her  hands  off  American 


17 


shores?  And  since  time  changes  the  relations  and 
feelings  of  men,  we  cannot  know  who  will  be  our 
friends  and  who  our  enemies  fifty  years  hence. 

Another  valid  objection  to  our  conclusion  from 
the  League  is  the  fact  that  preparedness  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient security  against  war.  War  has  taught  its  pupils 
a  fine  lesson — one  man  may  kill  a  thousand  with  one 
stroke.  Science  may  yet  invent  such  effective  instru- 
ments of  death  that  one  aeroplane,  obscured  by  the 
clouds,  may,  by  dropping  one  poisonous  bomb,  exterm- 
inate all  animate  matter  within  a  radius  of  a  mile  or 
more.  It  would  not  require  a  large  equipped  army  to 
do  the  damage.  One  man  can  do  that  if  he  is  daring 
and  skillful  and  thus  a  small  and  poor  nation  such  as 
Mexico,  might  hold  a  weapon  which  would  be  a  con- 
stant terror,  no  matter  how  strong  and  well  prepared 
we  might  be. 

The  only  factor  deterring  one  nation  from  attack- 
ing another  in  the  future,  will  be  the  fear  of  offending 
the  concert  of  nations.  Those  who  isolate  themselves 
and  proclaim  that  they  are  ready  to  take  care  of 
themselves  in  all  emergencies,  will  be  deprived  of  this 
one  and  all  important  protection. 

The  opponents  to  a  League  must  be  convinced  that 
its  adoption  is  inevitable.  Their  opposition,  however, 
is  also  necessary  because  it  will  bring  out  the  weak 
points  in  the  League  and  lead  to  the  perfection  of  the 
document. 


18 


The  suggestions  here  offered  will,  I  believe,  over- 
come some  of  the  objections  advanced  by  our  Sena- 
tors: 

1.  The  reciprocal  method  of  choosing  the  Repre- 
sentatives would,  in  a  measure,  remedy  the  "unbal- 
anced vote  question."  The  comments  by  the  most 
conservative  statesmen  upon  this  novel  method  indi- 
cates that  there  is  considerable  merit  in  such  a  system. 
It  balances  the  obligation  of  fidelity  of  each  delegate. 
It  may  not  be  perfect  but  it  may  be  a  practical  founda- 
tion for  further  developments. 

2.  The  bonding  of  nations  is  a  guarantee  against 
breaking  treaties.  Bankers  and  leaders  in  interna- 
tional law  have,  as  a  rule,  commented  favorably  upon 
the  feasibility  of  this  feature  and  its  practical  applica- 
tion ;  but  others  have  objected  to  it,  claiming  that  the 
nations  would  prefer  a  gentleman's  agreement  to  pen- 
alty methods. 

This  objection  may  be  valid  but  it  is  open  to  ques- 
tion. Is  the  requirement  of  a  bond  a  reflection  upon 
the  integrity  of  a  nation?  The  most  reverend  gentle- 
man in  the  country — even  the  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court, — if  he  wished  to  make  a  large  loan, 
would  be  asked  by  the  banker  to  schedule  his  prop- 
erty or  give  a  guarantee.  Past  experiences  has  shown 
that  all  nations  cannot  be  trusted  on  a  gentleman's 
agreement. 

Without  a  thorough  study  of  the  appHcation  of  bond- 


19 


ing,  one  is  apt  to  discard  it  by  the  very  simple  com- 
ment :  "Money  did  not  keep  the  nations  from  the  last 
war,  why  should  it  in  the  future?"  This  is  a  very 
superficial  argument  —  it  lacks  the  knowledge  of 
psychology.  A  nation  once  in  the  struggle  will  spend 
its  last  dollar  to  win, — it  does  not  count  the  cost  or 
consider  how  it  will  pay  its  debts. 

Quite  different  would  be  their  attitude  if  a  large 
sum  would  have  to  be  forfeited  the  moment  they 
start  to  fight.  The  aggressor  would  deliberate,  before 
he  made  his  first  move,  knowing  that  the  moment  he 
broke  his  word  and  started  a  conflict,  he  would  forfeit 
an  enormous  sum. 

The  psychology  of  recklessness  of  man  when  in 
danger  and  the  conservatism  when  in  security  may  be 
illustrated  by  comparing  the  usual  attitude  of  man 
when  he  is  well  or  when  very  ill.  When  he  is  well, 
he  is  apt  to  hesitate  to  spend  a  dollar  to  prevent  sick- 
ness, but  let  him  be  overtaken  by  a  serious  illness  and 
he  will  ask  for  the  most  expensive  consultant.  So  a 
nation  will  hesitate  to  start  a  conflict  with  the  uncer- 
tainty of  winning  and  the  absolute  certainty  of  for- 
feiting its  bonds  whether  they  win  or  lose.  Would 
the  bonding  not  be  at  least  a  formidable  deterrent  to 
war? 

Judging  from  the  opinions  of  statesmen  and  pro- 
fessors of  international  law  to  whom  a  previous  copy 
of  this  paper  has  been  submitted,  I  am  confident  that 


20 


an  INTERNATIONAL  LEGISLATIVE  BODY 
chosen  by  the  RECIPROCAL  method  and  a  diplo- 
matically drawn-up  JOINT  TREATY  OF  ALL  NA- 
TIONS (with  the  additional  safeguard  of  a  heavy 
BOND  against  its  violations)  would  be  a  certain  step 
towards  the  realization  of  a  lasting  peace. 


21 


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OVERDUE. 


APR  26  MO 

MAR  24 1841 

SEP  4    1342 

ftft^iR  18  V943 

j 

LD  21-100m-7,'39(402s) 

i 

Photomount 

Pamphlet 

Binder 

Gayiord  Bros.,  Inc. 

Makers 
Stockton,  Calif. 

PAT.  JAN.  21,  1908 


X 


829757 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  UBRARY 


